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THE RISE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM IN GERMANY: A PRELUDE TO NAZI ARBITRARINESS? 
 
BY KENNY YANG
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper will first look at the rise of legal positivism that left the door ajar for Nazi arbitrariness 
to enter the system, and how in adopting  a separation of „is‟ and „ought‟ approach to the law, it 
left the German legal profession little theoretical resources to resist such arbitrariness. The paper 
will then juxtapose a hypothetical: whether natural law might have offered better theoretical 
resources to resist such arbitrariness and conclude with a brief reflection of the dangers of such a 
strict separation of „is‟ and „ought‟ to legal analysis if we are to learn from history and wish to 
avoid a repeat of the atrocities of the Nazi system.  
 
II.  LEGAL  POSITIVISM: THE SEPARATION THESIS 
 
A.  The ius and lex divide 
 
Legal positivists believe that the question of what is the law is separate from, and must be kept 
separate from, the question of what the law ought to be.
1  Legal positivism is thus distinguished 
by two claims: that the law is separable from its substantive morality and that  there is no 
necessary link between law and morality.
2 Evinced in Hart‟s recognition rule, the „master test for 
legal  validity‟,
3  it  „points  to  the  separation  of  the  identification  of  the  law  from  its  moral 
evaluation, and the separation of statements of what the law is from statements about what it 
should be‟.
4 In the words of John Austin: 
 
                                                 
  Final year LLB (Hons) student at Murdoch University. 
1   Bian Bix, Jurisprudence Theory and Concept (Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd ed, 1999) 31. 
2   David Richards, „Terror and the Law‟ (1983) 5 Human Rights Quarterly 171, 172; Lloyd L Weinreb, „Law As Order‟ 
(1978) 91 Harvard Law Review 909, 909. 
3   Jonathan Crowe, Legal Theory (Thompson Reuters, 2009) 52. 
4   H L A Hart, „Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals‟ (1958) 71 (4) Harvard Law Review 593, 618; Bix, 
above n 1, 36.  
Page 2 of 12 
 
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is one 
enquiry; whether it be or not be conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, 
which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it...
5 
 
Additionally, Hans Kelsen‟s „reine Rechtslehre‟, or „pure theory of law‟, describes the law and 
attempts to eliminate from the object of this description everything that is not strictly „law‟.
6 He 
proposes „freeing the science of law from alien elements‟.
7 This „pure‟ theory of law then may be 
studied without reference to political, moral or sociological notions. Legal positivism is study the 
science of law as separate and independent from morality and notions of ethics.
8 Law (lex) does 
not  have  any  necessary  connection  with  justice  (ius)  and  accordingly,  what  is  can  be 
distinguished from what ought to be. By separating the „is‟ from the „ought‟ in legal analysis, 
positivists have expelled morality and ethics from jurisprudence.
9 
 
B.  The Rise of Legal Positivism in Germany 
 
Prior to the influence of legal positivism in Germany, the ius and lex divide was less pronounced. 
Indeed as Radbruch noted, the study of law in Germany was once under the curriculum title „The 
Law  of  Nature‟,
10  reflecting  its  inseparability  from  justice  and  morality.  While  the  exact 
historical  origins  of  legal  positivism  are  open  to  debate,
11  it  is  „rooted  in  the  empiricist 
interpretation of the scientific revolution‟.
12 The nineteenth century saw a series of significant 
events such as the French revolution and the scientific and industrial developments in Europe at 
the time, notably under the influence of the „Darwinian Age‟.
13 Technological, economic and 
scientific  progress  saw  a   human  endeavour  to  pursue  enlightenment  through  a  scientific, 
objective  approach.  In  light  of  this,  the  natural  law,  seemingly  based  on  a  subjective, 
                                                 
5   John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press: 1995) 157. 
6   Ibid 52. 
7   Crowe, above n 3, 36. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law Pt II (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 1. 
8   Steven J Burton, „Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism‟ (1987) 73 Iowa Law Review 109, 114. 
9    Michael Dawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American thought, 1860-1945 (Cambridge University Press, 
1997) 90, cited in Augusto Zimmermann, Legislating Evil: The Philosophical Foundations of the Nazi Legal System 
(2010) 13 International Trade and Business Law Review 221, 232. Though Hans Kelsen was himself expelled from 
his position at the University of Cologne. 
10   J M Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2007) 379. 
11   Crowe, above n  3, 29. In retrospect, traces of positivism can be seen in Greek and Roman philosophy, see Mark 
Tebbit, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2005) 15. 
12   Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2005) 15. 
13   E Hambloch, German Rampant: A Study in Economic Materialism (Duckworth, 1939) 14.  
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„mystical‟morality entered hibernation (until its resurgence marked by the Nuremburg principles) 
as it was set aside in favour of legal positivism, an approach that seemed objective, discernable 
and therefore more appropriate. 
 
III.  THE FREE LAW MOVEMENT 
 
A discussion of the rise of legal positivism in Germany would not be complete without a word on 
the Free Law Movement that emerged from the German School of Historical Law. While not 
entirely aligned with the school of legal positivism, it did somewhat assist in the demise of 
natural law by firing the first shots against it. The German School of Historical Law,
15 based on 
the work of Friedrich Carl von Savigny and Gustav Hugo, emphasised the historical limitations 
of the law and stood in opposition to natural law.
16 Savigny approached law as an expression of 
the convictions of a specific people.
17 Law according to him, was not grounded in univers al 
principles, but in a organic, growing consciousness of the spirit of the people , the Volksgeist, 
which adapts itself to the evolving needs of society. This translated into the idea that the state can 
be defined as a political organism comprising many legal agreements between smaller entities.
18 
This subsequently resulted in a disinterest in individual rights in favour of „the sovereignty of the 
state‟.
19 
 
However, in asking for the legal system to respect particular habits of a people, and to examine 
the law from a historical approach, the historicist thesis eventually resulted in a form of legal and 
moral relativism.
20As Leo Strauss noted, the problem with historicism „is that all societies have 
their ideals, cannibal society no less than civilised ones…If principles are sufficiently justified by 
the fact that they are accepted by a society, the principles of cannibalism are as defensible or 
                                                 
15   The Historical School of Law lead the framework for the German conceptual jurisprudence  Begriffsjuriprudenz 
(which considered social, economic, moral, political or religious considerations irrelevant to jurisprudence) and later 
Gesetzepositivismus  (legal  positivism), Walter  Ott  and  Frankzika  Buob,  „Did  Legal  Positivism  Render  German 
Jurists Defenceless During the Third Reich?‟ (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 91, 95. 
16   Ibid. 
17   Augusto Zimmermann, Legislating Evil: The Philosophical Foundations of the Nazi Legal System (2010) 13 
International Trade and Business Law Review 221, 232. 
18 J Seitzer and C Thornhill, „An Introduction to Carl Schmitt‟s Constitutional Theory: Issues and Context‟, in Carl 
Schmidtt, Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, 2008) 12. 
19 Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Hendrickson, 2008) 75. 
20   Kelly, above n 10, 324.  
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sound as those of civilised life‟.
21 This thus found fertile ground for radical Nazi justification of 
heinous laws. 
 
Finally, the German School of Historical Law in some ways paved the way to legal positivism as 
it led to a school of jurists whose work culminated in a form of positivism.
22 It was hoped that 
this new positivist approach to law could assist in building a new national legal system to unify 
the politically fragmented nation.
23 This approach of „law is law‟
24 therefore was predominant in 
Germany before the Nazi take-over.
25 
 
IV.  POSITIVISM AND ITS ROLE IN DISARMING GERMAN JUSTICE AND LEGITIMISING NAZI 
AUTHORITY 
 
There are of course, a number of other factors which could be attributed to the legal profession‟s 
lack of resistance against Nazi authority. Müller contends that the German legal profession‟s 
inherent  „loyalty to  state leadership‟
26 found a feeling of obligation to  the Nazi  government 
authority.
27 It has also been suggested that a number of German legal professionals,  dissatisfied 
with liberalism  at  the  time  of  the  Nazi‟s  rise  to  power,  already  supported  them  in  different 
ways.
28 As Kaufmann wrote, when the National Socialists intruded upon basic rights, the only 
audible sound was applause.
29  
 
These factors aside though, it is hard to deny that legal positivism, in its strict insistence on the 
division of law and morality, permitted the legal profession to r ationalise to themselves and 
others their interpretation and application of laws that they might   have, upon reflection, 
                                                 
21   Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago University Press, 1965) 3. 
22   Kelly, above n 10, 324. 
23   Ibid. 
24   Thomas Mertens, But was it law? (2006) 7 German Law Journal 191, 192. 
25   Ibid; James E Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy (University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 1. 
26   Markus Dirk Dubber, „Judicial Positivism and Hitler‟s Injustice‟ (1933) 93 Columbia Law Review 1807, 1811-1811. 
27   Though it should be noted that Muller‟s argument does not explain why the same judges that applied eugenics law 
after 1933 had not felt the same sense of loyalty  to the Weimar Republic, See  Markus Dirk Dubber, „Judicial 
Positivism and Hitler‟s Injustice‟ (1933) 93 Columbia Law Review 1807, 1811-1811. 
28   Arthur  Kaufmann,  „National  Socialism  and  German  Jurisprudence  from  1933  to  1945‟  (1988)  9  Cardozo  Law 
Review 1629, 1634. 
29   Ibid 1635.  
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considered to be grotesque.
30 Sufficed to say, while legal positivism may not have been the sole 
cause in the German legal profession‟s lack of resistance, it nonetheless is a relevant one. 
 
A.  Disarming German Justice 
 
In insisting on the validity of law independent of its moral content,
31 or indeed to a higher order, 
positivism held that it was „not for legal scholars to be concerned with right and wrong or good 
and  bad,  but  merely  to  clarify,  conceptualize  and  explain  the  authoritative  legal  precepts‟.
32 
Arguably, this „unwillingness to enquire into the morality of law by judges, lawyers and legal 
scholars led to an easy capture of the legal system by the Nazis and facilitated its modification to 
meet evil Nazi goals‟.
33  
 
There is the question as to whether German legal professionals acquiesced to Nazi authority for 
fear of their lives. This is conceivable, but it has been also suggested that this obedience to even 
arbitrary laws of the Nazi regime is not so much a lack of legal conscience or cowardice,
34 but an 
inherited self-understanding that one‟s own conscience or discretion should neither feature in the 
understanding of law nor affect its outcome.
35 Rice contends that had the legal profession not 
embraced the rigid form of positivism, but denounced Nazi injustices based on the traditional 
principles of natural law, the Nazis may not have found it so easy to gain support. This however, 
was not the case and as most of the German legal profession were strict legal positivists,
36 they 
were accordingly disarmed by the very principle they were so eager to embrace.
37 
 
B.  Legitimising Nazi Authority 
 
                                                 
30   Markus Dirk Dubber, „Judicial Positivism and Hitler‟s Injustice‟ (1933) 93 Columbia Law Review 1807, 1811-1825-
1826. 
31   James E Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy (University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 1. 
32   Ibid. 
33   Ibid 2. 
34   Markus Dirk Dubber, „Judicial Positivism and Hitler‟s Injustice‟ (1933) 93 Columbia Law Review 1807, 1811-1817 
cited in Richard A Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard University Press, 1995) 146. 
35   Peter Caldwell, „Legal Positivism and Weimar Democracy‟ (1994) 39 American Journal of Jurisprudence 273, 275. 
36   Steizer  and  C  Thornhill,  „An  Introduction  to  Carl  Schmitt‟s  Constitutional  Theory:  Issues  and  Context‟,  in  C 
Schmidt, Constitutional Theory (2008) 10. 
37   Charles Rice, „Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence‟ (1989) 24 Wake Forest Law Review 
539, 567.  
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According to D'Entrèves, ‘adherence to positivism on part of jurists under fascist, Nazi, and 
collaborating governments has often been adduced to explain their readiness to acquiesce to the 
decree of those regimes without regard for broader considerations of right‟.
38 Burton notes that to 
the positivist, an evil legal system can be still be treated as legal systems without in any way 
implying they have moral value, while the non-positivists would struggle in maintaining such are 
legal systems at all.
39 
 
If, as Kelsen proposes,  laws are valid not by virtue of the substantive content, but in reference to 
being enacted by the proper legal authority, then a law which can be properly enacted by the state 
must not be disobeyed or rendered invalid, even if such laws are immoral.
40 According to Hart, a 
morally  iniquitous  law  under  which  a  husband‟s  alleged  traitorous  statements  about  Hitler, 
denounced his wife, and sentenced to death, was still law.
41 Arguably, this „master test for legal 
validity‟
42 would have deemed Hitler‟s laws valid as they met the „conventional criteria‟ agreed 
upon and accepted at the time.
43  
 
In the eyes of legal positivism, the validity of law is seen as a result of its authority, properly 
enacted, absent moral considerations.
44 Its attempt to separate law and morals, while normatively 
attractive, was analytically weak and it not only offered no theoretical legal resource for the 
people to resist Nazi rule, it may even have played some role in legitimizing it. 
 
C.  The Recantation of Radbruch 
 
                                                 
38   Alessandro Passerin D'Entrèves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Transaction, 2009) xiv.  
39   Steven J Burton, „Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism‟ (1987) 73 Iowa Law Review 109, 114. 
40   R A Hughes, G W G Leane and A Clarke,  Australian Legal Institutions: Principles, Structure and Organisation 
(Lawbook, 2003) 32. 
41   See H L A Hart, „Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals‟ (1958) 71 (4) Harvard Law Review 593, See 
also Lon Fuller, „Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart‟ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630, 
653-654. 
42   Crowe, above n 3, 52  
43   H O Pappe, „On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era‟ (1960) 23(3) The Modern Law Review 260, 262; 
Markandey Katju, „The Hart-Fuller Debate‟ (2001) PL Web Journal 1. 
44   R A Hughes, G W G Leane and A Clarke,  Australian Legal Institutions: Principles, Structure and Organisation 
(Lawbook, 2003) 32. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law Pt II (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 1, 17 [29].  
Page 7 of 12 
 
Gustav Radbruch,
45 who was himself a supporter of positivism prior to World War II,
46 later 
renounced  positive  law,
47  blaming  it  for  failing  to  provide an  intellectual  defence  against 
arbitrary state power
48 and acknowledging that „the doctrine that the law was whatever a statute 
said had rendered German justice helpless when confronted with cruelty and injustice once those 
wore statute vestures.‟
49 Radbruch subsequently saw a revival of belief in transcendent law by 
which  evil  positive  laws  may  be  condemned,  as  evinced  in  his  later  publication  of 
Rechtsphilosophie.
50 In the aftermath of the war, Germany and the world realised the dangers of 
the  expulsion  of  ethics  and  metaphysics  from  the  understanding  of  law.  Accordingly,  the 
Nuremberg Principle,
51 recognising this, stated that individuals have „a duty to disobey laws 
which are clearly recognisable as violating higher moral principles.‟
52 
 
V.  A HYPOTHETICAL: COULD THE NATURAL LAW HAVE PROVIDED BETTER TOOLS TO RESIST 
NAZI ARBITRARINESS? 
 
A.  lex iniusta non est lex 
 
Charles Rice proposes that it would be interesting to speculate what might have been the German 
profession‟s  response  had  it  adopted  a  resounding  rejection  of  Nazi  arbitrariness  based  on 
principles of the natural law.
53 It is often taken for granted that the law can be criticised on moral 
grounds.
54 It is to the natural law that one  can turn to obtain the basis of this understanding. 
                                                 
45   For a further examination of Radbruch‟s pre and post war theories see Frank Haldmann, „Gustav Radbruch vs Hans 
Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law‟ (2005) 18(2)  Ratio Juris 632, Stanley L Paulson, „Radbruch on Unjust Laws: 
Competing Earlier and Later Views?‟ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 489 and Gustav Radbruch, „Five 
Minutes of Legal Philosophy‟ (1945) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13.   
46   Sanne Taekma, The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 63. 
47   Peter Caldwell, „Legal Positivism and Weimar Democracy‟ (1994) 39 American Journal of Jurisprudence 273, 274; 
Matthew Lippman, „Law, Lawyers and Legality in the Third Reich: The Perversion of Principle and Professionalism 
(1997) 11 Temple International and Comparative Journal of Law 199, 200. 
48   Matthew Lippman, „Law, Lawyers and Legality in the Third Reich: The Perversion of Principle and Professionalism 
(1997) 11 Temple International and Comparative Journal of Law 199, 200. 
49   Kelly, above n 10, 379. 
50   Ibid. Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (1950). 
51   Rodger Citron, „The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, The Revival of 
Natural law, and the development of Legal Process Theory‟ (2006) 385 Michigan State Law Review 401. 
52   G A Moens, „The German Borderguard Cases: Natural Law and the Duty to Disobey Immoral Laws‟ in S Ratnapala 
and G A Moens (eds), Jurisprudence of Liberty (Butterworths, 1996) 147. 
53   Rice, above n 31.   
54   Bix, above n 1, 62.  
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Unlike legal positivism, the theory of natural law can be described as laws that are more than the 
mere affairs of human convention or agreement,
55 and must conform to some permanent, higher 
standard of justice and morality.
56 Cicero speaks of a „Supreme Law which had its origins ages 
before any written law‟,
57 and articulates of the „foolish notion in the belief that everything is just 
which is found in the customs or laws of nations‟.
58 Cicero however, acknowledges that „many 
pernicious and harmful measures are constantly enacted among peoples which do not deserve the 
name of law‟.
59Similarly, St Thomas Aquinas describes natural law as being related to natural 
human inclinations, such as a natural inclination to be good
60 and highlights that where human 
law no longer reflected the natural law, then „it is no longer a law but a perversion of law‟.
61  
 
Perhaps most illustrative of this point however, is St Augustine of Hippo‟s analogy with criminal 
gangs and kingdoms, where he noted the similarities between the two in creating rules emanating 
from an entity in a position of authority. According to Augustine, the only difference between the 
law and a set of rules observed by criminal gangs is that the former properly reflect the demands 
of justice, whereas the latter does not.
62 These theories view the law as a concept inseparable 
from morality and justice,
63 and its underlying notion is that what naturally is, ought to be.
64 
 
This regard to a higher standard of justice and morality offers a safeguard to the unjust laws 
proposed by man. „An unjust law‟, in the words of St Augustine, „would not seem to be a law at 
                                                 
55   Henry  B  Veatch  „Natural  Law  Dead  or  Alive?‟  (1978)  1  Literature  of  Liberty:  A  Review  of  Contemporary 
Liberal,Thought  17. See Jonathan Crowe, Legal Theory (Thompson Reuters, 2009) 13 and Bian Bix, Jurisprudence 
Theory and Concept (Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd ed, 1999) 63, which discusses the debate as to whether these elements 
of the natural law is derived from a divine or religious nature or one that can be attained through right reason of the 
common good. While theologians such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas certainly had a profound influence on the 
natural  law,  its  tradition  can  be  traced  to  the  time  of  Ancient  Greek  Philosophers.  See  also  Hugo  Grotius, 
Prolegomena De Jure Belli ac Pacis, (F W Kelsey, trans, Liberal Arts Press, 1957) 6 for a „secular‟ theory of natural 
law. 
56   Crowe, above n 3, 10-22. 
57   M T Cicero, De Legibus Pt I. 6. 18-19. 
58   M T Cicero, De Republica 3.31-43 
59   M T Cicero, De Legibus, Part II, 5, 13 
60   Kelly, above n 10, 144. 
61   T Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Pt II-I, Question 95, Article 2. 
62   Jonathan Crowe, Legal Theory (Thompson Reuters, 2009) 23; St Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, Book III 
Para 28. 
63   Crowe, above n 3, 10; Michael D Bayles, Hart’s Legal Philosophy: An Examination (Kluwer, 1992) 116. 
64   Henry B Veatch „Natural Law Dead or Alive?‟ (1978) 1 Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal 
Thought 17 (emphasis added).  
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all‟.
65 Natural law lays down the foundations for morality in law and sets forth the standards of 
universal justice of the eternal law that man-made laws should reflect in order to be „true law‟. 
The unjust laws offered by the Nazis, not reflecting these higher standards would be nothing 
more than the rules of a criminal gang,
66 exploiting others for their own benefit, and need not, 
prima facie, be obeyed.
67 Natural law provides the theoretical resource for us to „confidently 
make, if not always to prove, spontaneous statements like “that is not fair” or “that is unjust”‟.
68 
It provides, in short, the tools required to resist arbitrariness. It might have, as Rice suggests, 
have offered a more resounding tool for the German legal profession in resisting the evil laws of 
the  Nazis.  It  could  have  perhaps  allowed  Germany  to  see  what  the  Nazis  truly  were,  in  St 
Augustine‟s analogy – a criminal gang and its laws as such should be rejected as true law. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In proposing a rigid separation of „is‟ and „ought‟ from legal analysis, positivism appears to have 
promoted the expulsion of ethics and metaphysics from jurisprudence.
69 This strict distinction 
not only saw the laws of the Nazi regime as valid, but lead to an unwillingness to enquire into the 
morality of law and  an inherited self-understanding that one‟s  own conscience or discretion 
should neither feature in the understanding of law nor affect its outcome. The Nazi‟s cruelty, 
upon donning the vestures of statutes, rendered German justice helpless. Legal positivism not 
only  offered  no  theoretical  legal  resource  for  the  German  legal  profession  to  resist  Nazi 
arbitrariness, it may have assisted in legitimizing Nazi rule. 
  
   
                                                 
65   Crowe, above n 3, 24.  
66   Ibid. 
67   Crowe, above n 3, 24. Bian Bix, Jurisprudence Theory and Concept (Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd ed, 1999) 64. 
68   R S White, Natural Law in English Renaissance Literature (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 3. 
69   Michael Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945 (1997) 90 cited in Augusto 
Zimmermann, Legislating Evil: The Philosophical Foundations of the Nazi Legal System (2010) 13 International 
Trade and Business Law Review 221, 233.  
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